Faglitteratur

Korruption generelt

• Andvig, Jens C. et al (2001), Corruption. A Review of Contemporary Research, nupi, Oslo

• Dutta, J., Aidt, T.S. (Eds.), 2016. The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics Series, vol. 324. Elgar, Cheltenham.

• Fisman, R., & Golden, M. A. (2017). Corruption: What everyone needs to know. Oxford University Press.

• Gambetta, Diego (2002), Corruption: An Analytical Map, i: Kotkin, S. og Sajó, A., Political Corruption in Transition. A Sceptic’s Handbook, CEU Press, Budapest

• Goudie, A. W., Stasavage, David (1998), A Framework for the Analysis of Corruption, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 29, No. 2-3, pp. 113-59

• Heidenheimer, A.J., Johnson, M., LeVine, V. (Eds.), 1989. Political Corruption: A Handbook. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ

• Jain, Arvind K. (2001), Corruption: A Review, i S. Sayer (red.), Issues in New Political Economy, Blackwell, Oxford
• Klitgaard, Robert (1990), Controlling Corruption, University of California Press
• Lohmann, Jens (2005), Noget for noget -Håndbog om korruption, Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke
• Mauro, Paulo (1998), Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research, Finance & Development, March 1998. The World Bank, Washington D.C.
• Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1996), The Political economy of Corruption – Causes and Consequences, Viewpoint, World Bank Note series no. 74
• Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999), Corruption and Government. Causes and Consequences, and Reform, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
• Schleifer, Andrei og Vishny, Robert W. (1993), Corruption, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 599-617
• Sik, Endre (2002), The Bad, the Worse and the Worst: Guesstimating the Level of Corruption, i: Kotkin, Stephen og Sajó, András, Political Corruption in Transition. A Sceptic’s Handbook, CEU Press, Budapest, pp. 91-113
• Tullock, Gordon (1993), Rent Seeking, The Shaftesbury Papers, 2, Edward Elgar, Aldershot

Empiriske undersøgelser

• Amore, M. D., & Bennedsen, M. (2013). The value of local political connections in a low-corruption environment. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(2), 387-402.

• Ledeneva, Alena V. (2001), Unwritten rules. How Russia’s really works, Centre for European Reform, London

• Nordstrom, Carolyn. 2004. Shadows of War: Violence, Power and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century. Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Schneider, Friedrich og Enste, Dominik (2000), Shadow Economies Around the World: Sizes, Causes, and Consequences, IMF Working Paper No. 00/26, Washington DC

Korruption som socialt fænomen

• Cartier-Bresson, Jean (1997), Corruption Networks, Transaction Security and Illegal Social Exchange, Political Studies, Vol. 45, pp. 463-476

• Bjørnskov, C., Paldam, M., 2005. Corruption trends and social capital. Chapter 4 pp 59-75 in Lambsdorff, J.G., Taube, M., Schramm, M., eds.,The New Institutional Economics of Corruption. Routledge (Frontiers of Political Economy): London and New York

• Fisman, R., & Miguel, E. (2007). Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets. Journal of Political economy, 115(6), 1020-1048

• Lambsdorff, Johan G. (2002), Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law, Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, Vol. 48, pp. 221-241

• Paldam, M., 2001 Corruption and Religion. Adding to the economic model. Kyklos 54, 383-414

Årsager til korruption

• Colombatto, Enrico (2001), Discretionary Power, Rent-Seeking and Corruption, ICER Working Paper No. 24, Torino
• Johnson, Simon et al (2000), Why do firms bribe? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 76, pp. 495-520
• Johnson, Simon, Kaufman, Daniel og Zoidon-Lobaton, Pablo (1998), Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy, The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 387-392
• Lederman, Daniel, Loayza, Norman og Soares, Rodrigo Reis (2001), Accountability and Corruption. Political Institutions Matter, World Bank 2001

Konsekvenser af korruption

• Abed, George T. and Gupta, Sanjeev (red.) (2002), Governance, Corruption, & Economic Performance, IMF
• Bardhan, Pranab (1997), Corruption and Development. A Review of Issues, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 1320-1346
• Eilat, Yair og Zinnes, Clifford (2002), The Shadow Economy in Transition Countries: Friend or Foe? A Policy Perspective, World Development, Vol. 30, No. 7, pp. 1233-1254
• Friedman, Eric et al (2000), Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries, i Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 76, pp. 459-493
• Gupta, Sanjeev, Davoodi, Hamid, Alonso-Terme, Rosa(1998), Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?, IMF Working Paper 98/76
• Kaufmann, Daniel og Wei, Shang-Jin (1999), Does “Grease Money” Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?, World Bank
• Lambsdorf, Johann Graf (2001), How Corruption in Government Affects Public Welfare – A Review of Theories, Discussion Paper No. 9, Center for Globalization and Europeanization, University of Goettingen
• Sarte, Pierre-Daniel G. (1999), Informality and Rent-Seeking Bureaucracies in a Model of Long-Run Growth, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Paper No. 99-7, Richmond VI
• Tanzi, Vito and Davoodi, Hamid (1997): Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth. IMF Working Paper WP/97/139
• Wei, Shang-Jin (1999), Corruption in Economic Development. Beneficial Grease, Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle?, Harvard University og NBER

Korruption i international udviklingsbistand

• Bailey, Bruce (2003), Synthesis of lessons learned of donor practices in fighting corruption
• Bailey, Bruce (2003), What Have Donor Agencies Learned From Their Efforts?, Executive summary of a speech given at the 11th International Anti-Corruption Conference 2003 in Seoul, South Korea
• Bretton Woods project (2003), Inside the Institutions:How the World Bank deals with fraud and corruption in its projects, Washington D.C.
• Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Danida Action Plan to Fight Corruption, Copenhagen
• Gabriel, Lara M. and Stapenhurst, Rick, with Mary Thomas (eds.) (2000), The Role of Bilateral Donors in Fighting Corruption, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

• Gundlach, E., Paldam, M., 2009. The transition of corruption: From poverty to honesty. Economic Letters. 103, 146-48

• Mathisen, Harald (2003), Donor Roles in the Face of Endemic Corruption – Albania in the Policy Debate, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen

• Moody-Stuart, George (1997), Grand Corruption. How Business Bribes Damage Developing Countries, WorldView Press, Oxford

• NORAD (2000), NORAD’s Good governance and anti-corruption plan 2000-2001, Oslo
• OECD, DAC (2003), Synthesis of Lessons Learned of Donor Practices in Fighting Corruption, Paris (DCD/DAC/GOVNET(2003)1)

• Paldam, M., 2021. The Grand Pattern of Development and the Transition of Institutions. Cambridge UP, Cambridge UK and New York

Korruption i international handel

• Campos, Edgardo J., Lien, Donald og Pradhan, Sanjay(1999), The Impact of Corruption on Investment: Predictability Matters, World Development, Vol. 27, No. 6, pp. 1059-67
• Hansen, Jeppe Kromann (2004), Rene hænder i Rusland. En analyse af udenlandske firmaer på fremmede markeder præget af korruption med danske firmaer i Rusland som case, speciale, Institut for Statskundskab, Københavns Universitet
• Hellman, Joel, Jones, Geraint og Kaufmann, Daniel(2002), Far From Home. Do Foreign Investors Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies?, World Bank 2002
• Lambsdorff, Johan G. (1998), An Empirical Investigation of Bribery in International Trade, i: Robinson, Mark (red.), Corruption and Development, European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 40-59
• OECD (2000), No Longer Business as Ususal. Fighting Bribery and Corruption, OECD, Paris

• Paldam, M., 2021. The Transition of Corruption. Institutions and dynamics European Journal of Political Economy 67(2), 17 pages, article 101952. Closely related to Chapter 10 in

• Paldam, M., 1990 Korruption og Udviklingsøkonomi. Økonomi & Politik 63, 3-20